International governance-is the G20 the right forum? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2009/05, March 2009 by Pisani-Ferry, Jean.
ISSUE 2009/05 
MARCH 2009 INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE
Is the G20 the right forum?
JEAN PISANI-FERRY
Highlights
• It is telling that one of the very first decisions taken after the crisis erupted
in full force in September 2008 was to reform international governance by
creating the G20. Yet the relationship between the financial crisis and global
governance is not entirely straightforward.
• The G20 is a significantly less suitable forum for discussion of regulatory
matters than of macroeconomic issues and their implications for the
institutions of global governance. 
• Most of the regulatory issues to be solved are the responsibility of the
narrow group of countries with sophisticated financial systems. While it is
sensible to involve developing and emerging countries in the reform of
financial regulation, they are unlikely to play a leading role.
• The macroeconomic dimension of the global agenda was largely overlooked
by the November G20 meeting but its main tenets have since then emerged.
On these, and on reform of international financial institutions, there can be
no meaningful discussion without emerging and developing countries. 
• If significant enough, reform of international financial institutions,
especially of the International Monetary Fund, could help contain instability.
The US and Europe must make the first move.
This policy contribution was prepared for the meeting of the Club de Madridon
26 March 2009.
Telephone
+32 2 227 4210 
info@bruegel.org
www.bruegel.org 
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTIONINTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCEJean Pisani-Ferry
02
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Is the G20 the right forum?1
JEAN PISANI-FERRY,MARCH 2009
IT IS TELLING THAT ONE OF THE VERY FIRST
DECISIONS taken after the crisis erupted in full
force in September 2008 was to reform
international governance by creating the G20. This
long overdue decision was in part accidental, but
it was nevertheless indicative of the consensus
within the international community that designing
and implementing an appropriate response
implied creating a more legitimate and more
effective body than the G7. The upcoming G20
meeting in London is expected to result in further
reforms, this time of the international financial
institutions. 
The relationship between the financial crisis and
global governance is not entirely straightforward.
The crisis is certainly by now a global one but it
has been at root a crisis of the US banking system
which immediately contaminated the European
banking system. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), US banks have suffered 57
percent of the losses on US-originated securitised
debt and European banks 39 percent, leaving only
14 percent for the rest of the world. It is only when
the crisis took a turn for the worse in September
2008 that the rest of the world really began to be
affected by capital flow reversals and the collapse
of world trade. More generally, North America and
Europe jointly represent 70 percent of the global
supply of financial assets and they probably
account for an even larger share of financial
regulation. This would suggest that managing the
financial crisis, and preventing future ones even
more so, could essentially have remained a
transatlantic affair. 
The need for a global economic venue where the
leaders of the major industrialised, emerging and
developing countries meet and discuss the re-
shaping of international governance is indis-
putable, but it is in fact much more pronounced in
other fields such as food security (with Europe
and North America jointly accounting for less than
one-third of world cereals demand), energy and
climate (with these two regions accounting for
only 40 percent of CO2 emissions), and trade
(where, again, Europe and North America only ac-
count for somewhat more than 40 percent of the
global total). 
It was nevertheless the financial crisis that trig-
gered a global governance change. The question
now is whether this discrepancy between its sub-
stantive agenda and its composition will make it
difficult for the G20 to deliver on the expectations
it has created. 
The idea put forward in this note is that the G20 is
a significantly less suitable forum for discussion
of regulatory matters than of macroeconomic is-
sues and their implications for the institutions of
global governance. While it is sensible to involve
developing and emerging countries in the reform
of financial regulation, they are unlikely to play a
leading role. On macroeconomic matters and as
regards institutional reform, however, no mean-
ingful discussion can take place without them. 
The first section of this note addresses the regula-
tory agenda. Macroeconomic dimensions are taken
up in section 2. Section 3 draws conclusions. 
1. This is a revised version
of a note prepared for
the meeting of the Club
de Madridon 26 March
2009. It also draws on a
presentation at the
FEEM-Bocconi
conference Back from
the Brink: Rethinking
Financial Regulationon
27 March 2009.‘The crisis in large part stemmed from shortcomings in financial regulation... The
shortcomings were in many respects entirely national... but weaknesses in international
governance have also contributed.’
Jean Pisani-Ferry INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
03
BRUEGEL
POLICY
CONTRIBUTION
1 THE REGULATORY AGENDA
It is widely accepted that the crisis in large part
stemmed from shortcomings in financial regula-
tion (shortcomings meaning ‘absence of/insuffi-
cient regulation’ but also ‘regulation which is unfit
for purpose’). Was this failure of governance pri-
marily a national failure, or a failure of interna-
tional cooperation which stronger global
governance can remedy?
The shortcomings were no doubt in many respects
entirely national. A few examples will illustrate
this. First, the belief that regulators cannot know
better than markets and that they can rely on pri-
vate actors for the assessment of risks had little to
do with global developments; also, the competi-
tion between public agencies that resulted in an
excessively lax supervision of US banks was a
purely internal flaw. By the same token, the very
uneven exposure to toxic assets of banks within
Europe illustrates that it was within the power of
national authorities to exercise strict oversight of
their banking systems – as Spain did with suc-
cess. The shortcomings of national authorities
cannot blindly be ascribed to international coordi-
nation failures. 
Weaknesses in international governance have,
however, also contributed to regulatory and su-
pervisory shortcomings. Three key channels can
be identified: 
• Competition among regulators and supervisors
resulting in ‘regulatory shopping’ by transna-
tional players and thus in a loosening of na-
tional regulations or a weakening of the
effectiveness of supervision. For example, the
off balance-sheet conduits of some German
banks were established in Dublin, which in part
explains why they were neglected by supervi-
sors. The same applies to the operation of
weakly regulated and supervised Icelandic
banks in the UK and elsewhere.  
• Disagreements among regulators resulting in
weak global standards, excessive reliance on
self-regulation or the subcontracting of impor-
tant aspects of standard-setting and imple-
mentation to private organisations. Key
examples here are the extensive reliance on
rating agencies by the regulators themselves,
especially but not only in the rulebook for in-
ternational banking supervision issued by the
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. The
painfully negotiated framework has been
largely invalidated by the crisis.     
• Resistance by national authorities to the trans-
fer of significant responsibilities to suprana-
tional bodies, resulting in incoherent and/or
vulnerable frameworks. A key problem here has
been the supervision of transnational financial
institutions. Some global banks have grown too
large to be supervised by any single national
authority and certainly too large to be bailed
out by any single national treasury. 
Despite its extensive legislative apparatus, the EU
itself has not been immune to these problems. The
choice of adopting the accounting standards
prepared by the IASB, a private organisation, was
largely the result of an inability to find agreement
among the national accounting boards through
negotiation. Resistance to sovereignty transfer is
evident in the debate over supervision. The
number of pan-European banks has grown in
recent years, while supervision remains
essentially national and coordination among
national agencies is of limited effect, yet there is
no willingness to contemplate radical reforms. The
recent Larosière report called for by the European
Commission and endorsed by the European
Council does not envisage centralising theINTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCEJean Pisani-Ferry
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supervision of pan-European banks and
advocates instead closer cooperation between
national authorities.
Crisis management since summer 2007 has con-
firmed that the tension between the globalisation
of finance and the weakness of international gov-
ernance is a major problem. Cooperation between
central banks in the provision of liquidity to dis-
tressed banks has been remarkably smooth but
international cooperation in dealing with banking
crises has been less exemplary. Many problems
have emerged, for example as regards the coordi-
nation of deposit guarantee schemes, but the
most difficult one has no doubt been the rescue
of banks with significant cross-border operations.
This raises major difficulties for small countries
with large, internationalised banking systems,
such as Austria or Ireland. 
The issue is especially acute within Europe where
only partial, ad-hoc solutions have been found (for
example, the joint bail-out of the Belgian-Dutch
group Fortis by the two governments). The crux of
the matter is that the taxpayer remains ultimately
national and that for this reason governments re-
ject the notion of a burden-sharing scheme that
would commit them to contributing to the budget-
ary rescue of a non-national bank. 
The upshot is that even in the EU, the tension be-
tween economic internationalisation and political
accountability has not been resolved. As pointed
out by the recent report of Lord Turner, chairman of
the British Financial Services Authority, ‘The cur-
rent arrangements [..] are not a sound basis for
the future regulation and supervision of European
cross-border retail banks. Sounder arrangements
require either increased national powers, implying
a less open single market, or a greater degree of
European integration’. 
From this perspective the G20 agenda provides
limited and partial response. The enlargement of
standard-setting committees to major emerging
countries (in fact, not to all G20 members) is a
sensible decision but it is not likely to change the
game. The enlargement to 12 new countries and
the European Commission of the Financial Stabil-
ity Forum, a club of regulators without a decision-
making structure, is likely to make its functioning
more cumbersome.  
On the whole the fate of global financial regulation
will continue to depend on the attitude of the main
financial players. So far, these players have not
departed from their traditional stance. The G20 No-
vember declaration insisted that ‘regulation is first
and foremost the responsibility of national regu-
lators’2. It is significant that on regulatory reform
the G20 has emphasised the role of the Financial
Stability Forum rather than that of the IMF, a struc-
tured institution equipped with decision-making
powers. The Obama administration is certainly
more sympathetic to global institutions than its
predecessor but Congress is unlikely to delegate
significant regulatory powers to supranational
bodies. It is therefore likely that cooperation will
be intensified further and that regulation will be
tightened but that the distribution of powers be-
tween national and international institutions will
remain broadly unchanged. 
What is uncertain is the attitude of private insti-
tutions. As Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank
of England, said, banks have experienced that
they are ‘global in life but national in death’ and
the perception that this is a reality is bound to in-
fluence their internationalisation strategy. At the
time of writing it is unclear whether the trend to-
wards the creation of global financial players will
continue or be significantly diminished by the ex-
perience of the crisis. 
2 THE MACROECONOMIC AGENDA
The macroeconomic roots of the crisis are less
unanimously recognised than its regulatory roots,
but a growing number of contributions have em-
phasised the role of global macroeconomic condi-
tions in creating an environment conducive to
financial instability. 
From the immediate aftermath of the Asian crisis
up to the outbreak of the global crisis, an unusual
but seemingly stable pattern of savings flows
2. The European insistence
on extending oversight
to all financial institu-
tions in all countries and
on cracking down on
regulatory and tax
havens can be seen as a
stepping stone towards
a comprehensive regula-
tory architecture. The
Europeans have learned
from experience that it
is only in exceptional cir-
cumstances that en-
trenched special
interests of this sort can
be overcome and they
have every reason to
push ahead with their
agenda. But this should
not obscure the fact that
tax and regulatory
havens are not the core
of the issue.Jean Pisani-Ferry INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
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prevailed in the world economy. For a decade the
poor countries, chiefly China, have been financing
the rich ones, chiefly the US, whose savings deficit
represented some two percent of world GDP.
Instead of resulting in capital flows from capital-
rich to capital-poor countries as expected,
financial globalisation has involved capital flowing
in the opposite direction. In 2005 Fed governor
(now president) Ben Bernanke famously spoke of
a ‘global savings glut’.
Several, possibly complementary, explanations
have been given to account for this surprising pat-
tern. Emerging countries, especially China, have
been accused of keeping their exchange rates ar-
tificially low in order to stimulate exports and run
a current-account surplus. Following the traumatic
experience of the 1997-1998 crisis, the accumu-
lation of foreign- exchange reserves by the same
countries has been seen as a form of self-insur-
ance that would avert recourse to the IMF if they
were to be confronted with macroeconomic and fi-
nancial shocks. Finally, it has been argued that
households and companies in those countries had
little trust in the quality of domestic financial as-
sets and that capital outflows resulted from their
preference for US-made assets of reportedly better
quality and safety. 
Whatever the weight given to these explanations,
the massive inflow of foreign savings to the US
economy was bound to impact its interest rates,
savings behaviour, and market for financial as-
sets. Indeed it contributed to keeping long-term
interest rates low, thereby fuelling the real-estate
boom, to lowering domestic savings, thereby feed-
ing the consumption boom, and to increasing the
demand for US-made safe or seemingly safe as-
sets, thereby contributing to leverage and the
manufacturing of assets of dubious quality. It is
these conditions that, combined with a lax regu-
latory environment, provided the perfect incuba-
tor for the boom-and-bust cycle. 
This type of analysis puts the spotlight on the lack
of global macroeconomic surveillance and the role
it could have played, had the world economy been
equipped with effective global institutions. In par-
ticular, exchange-rate surveillance should have
prompted policy corrections in light of the mas-
sive and protracted current-account surpluses and
deficits; trust in the multilateral regime should
have made self-insurance unnecessary; and, al-
though less straightforward, alternative assets
could have been offered to surplus countries. The
global pattern would have been different and ar-
guably less conducive to complacency about the
risk of instability.
This suggests that reform of the international fi-
nancial institutions should contribute to creating
the conditions for future financial stability. This di-
mension of the global agenda was largely over-
looked by the G20 meeting in November but its
main tenets have since then emerged. Global fi-
nancial institutions, especially the IMF, should: 
• Warn against economic and financial develop-
ments that involve a risk of instability and send
signals to governments and supervisory insti-
tutions so that they can tighten oversight ac-
cordingly;
• Provide effective insurance against private cap-
ital flow reversals, and for that they must be
equipped with sufficient firepower. This implies
matching their resources to their potential
needs in a context where crises are charac-
terised by massive outflows; 
• Exercise even-handed surveillance over the
policies of the major countries and blocs and
issue warnings when these policies contribute
to global instability. This implies making the in-
stitutions legitimate through more appropriate
representation and say for the participating
countries.
‘The spotlight is on the lack of global macroeconomic surveillance and the role it could have
played, had the world economy been equipped with effective global institutions. The global
pattern would have been less conducive to complacency about the risk of instability.’INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCEJean Pisani-Ferry
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This outline suggests that issues of governance
and of effectiveness are very closely linked.
Keynes used to say that the job of the IMF is ‘ruth-
less truth-telling’, but the Fund today lacks effec-
tiveness in dealing with global problems because
it does not have the legitimacy that would allow it
to tell the truth to China and the independence
that would allow it to tell the truth to the US. In fact,
it has done neither.  
Looking further ahead, the reform of global finan-
cial institutions should ultimately be seen as a
stepping stone towards a more balanced interna-
tional system of the sort recently advocated by
People’s Bank of China governor Zhou. Whatever
the questions raised by the proposal for a new
global currency, the political significance of the
initiative is crystal clear. It is equally clear that a
prerequisite for moving towards a more balanced
international system is bold institutional reform. 
The recent reform of quota and voice in the IMF
has evidently not been equal to these needs. It
has not even been sufficient to create or recreate
the requisite ownership of the institution among
emerging and developing countries. The G20 has
mandated ministers to prepare proposals to re-
form international financial institutions, including
giving more voice and representation to emerging
and developing economies, and G20 ministers
have agreed that this should be done by early
2011. This indispensable reform needs to go far
beyond the incremental changes agreed upon in
2008. It implies in practical terms a reduction in
the number of European votes and seats, possibly
leading to consolidation, and abandonment of the
US veto. Without such a reform the IMF will con-
tinue to be perceived as an instrument of yester-
day’s powers and will be unable to play the
macroeconomic role it needs to play. 
If there is a venue where such reforms need to be
discussed, it is the G20 summit. The matter is not
a technical but a political one. The question put to
the heads of state and government is whether
they agree on a major redistribution of powers
within the institution and at the same time on a
strengthening of its role and effectiveness. 
3 CONCLUSIONS
Back in November, global governance reform was
the world leaders’ chosen response to the out-
break of the crisis. They now have to deliver and
they are at risk of disappointing. This would be a
very unwelcome development, because it would
signal a collective inability to act and could trigger
retreat towards national, possibly nationalistic,
solutions. History teaches us that failed interna-
tional conferences in times of deep crisis are to be
avoided. 
The G20’s agenda so far has put the emphasis on
regulatory reform. There is no doubt room for sen-
sible initiatives, some of which are loosely related
to crisis prevention and some of which could have
more effect. Improved standards and more com-
prehensive regulatory and oversight coverage are
among them. But there are limitations to what the
G20 can do in this field. First, most of the issues to
be solved are the responsibility of the narrow
group of countries with sophisticated financial
systems. It is appropriate to involve emerging and
developing countries in the discussion but their
participation is unlikely to change the outcome
significantly. Second, regulatory cooperation can
be improved but there is little room for radical re-
form. Problems within the EU are an indication that
the supervision of financial institutions remains
a fundamentally national responsibility. Third, the
reforms are technical in nature and this adds to
the risk of disappointing. 
Reform of international financial institutions, first
‘Keynes used to say that the job of the IMF is ‘ruthless truth-telling’, but the Fund today does
not have the legitimacy that would allow it to tell the truth to China, or the independence that
would allow it to tell the truth to the US.’Jean Pisani-Ferry INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
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and foremost of the International Monetary Fund,
is a more promising avenue. If significant enough,
it could help contain developments conducive to
instability. It could embody the transition from a
US-dominated world economy to a more balanced,
multilateral regime. And it is the condition for re-
building trust in the system among emerging and
developing countries and thereby avoiding the re-
bellious behaviour observed in recent years. 
This is, at its core, a highly political issue where
only heads of state and government can take the
initiative. The G20 meeting in London offers a rare
opportunity for launching a bold reform process.
It is up to the United States and Europe to make
the first move, because it is their current power
and representation in the international financial
institutions which is preventing the rest of the
world from taking a stake in them..   
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